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Requirement for highly dependable machinery control system is growing from 
increased complexity of control systems and their ability to control critical machinery 
functions. This has been noticed by legal authorities and governing legislation is 
becoming effective. Legal requirements can be met by using methodology based on 
adequate functional safety standards. Standards require certain tools and methods for 
product life cycle planning and implementation. Development and operational work 
flow shall be adapted to fulfill those requirements. Main focus in the study is to interpret 
standard requirements to process changes and to understand basic philosophy for 
reliable programmable system hardware. Standards IEC 61508 and ISO 25119 are 
referenced as main source for requirements. 
Dependability is based on failure avoidance and control. Study introduces 
several failure avoidance tools and methods. V-model based work flow is adapted to 
industry specific requirements. Model includes life cycle approach, deliverable list and 
assessment checklist for safety related project flow. Documentation structure for good 
traceability is introduced for unit specification. System level analysis is based on failure 
mode and effect studies and usage of fault tree modeling helps to understand links 
between events. Safety level targeting model based on risk graph is introduced for usage 
in machinery-control-systems. Usage of tools and methods was tested in machinery-
control-system concept development. Developed concept is intended for operator 
interface and control tasks. Tools proved to be usable for engineering project and fully 
implemented documentation model shall fulfill basic assessment requirements. 
Developed concept itself is usable in critical control systems, but some fine tuning is 
needed. 
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Vaatimukset elektroniikan käyttövarmuudelle ovat kasvaneet viimeksi kuluneiden 
kymmenen vuoden aikana voimakkaasti, koska ohjausjärjestelmistä on tullut 
monimutkaisia ja ne ovat korvanneet mekaanisia turvalaitteita. Erityisesti 
turvallisuuskriittisten toimintojen ohjaaminen on yleistynyt. Muutos on huomattu myös 
tuoteturvallisuutta valvovien viranomaisten toimesta ja ohjausjärjestelmien toimintaa ja 
suunnittelua koskevia vaatimuksia on kehitetty. Lainsäädännölliset vaatimukset ovat 
tulossa voimaan lähiaikoina eri laiteympäristöille ja ne perustuvat olemassa oleviin 
toiminnallista turvallisuutta koskeviin standardeihin. Standardien mukaisuus savutetaan 
käyttämällä niissä kuvattuja toimintatapoja ja työkaluja koko tuotteen elinkaaren aikana 
aina esisuunnittelusta käytöstäpoistoon asti. Suunnittelu, kokoonpano ja asennustyön 
kulku tulee sovittaa täyttämään nuo vaatimukset. Työn tarkoituksena on selvittää 
keskeiset toimintatavat ja työkalut liittyen standardeihin ja käyttövarman elektroniikan 
toimintoihin. Toimintatapoja, työkaluja ja teknisiäratkaisuja arvioidaan myös työn 
aikana suunnitellun koneenohjauskonseptin kautta. 
Käyttövarma koneenohajausjärjestelmä mahdollistaa laitteen luotettavan käytön 
vaarantamatta ihmisiä tai ympäristöä. Tärkeä osa käyttövarmuutta on myös käytön 
jatkuvuus ja huollettavuus suunnitellusti. Käyttövarmuus tuleekin nähdä tuotteeseen 
sisäänrakennettuna ominaisuutena suunnittelun, valmistuksen ja käytön aikana. 
Käyttövarmuus perustuu virhetilanteiden välttämiseen ja niiden vaikutusten 
kontrollointiin. Virheet voidaan jakaa kahteen päälohkoon. Satunnaisia virheitä esiintyy 
laitteen eliniän aikana, mutta niiden aiheuttamia vaikutuksia tulee kontrolloida ja 
pienentää suunnitellusti. Systemaattisia virheitä esiintyy järjestelmässä moninaisista 
syistä johtuen. Vaarallista vikaantumista voidaan välttää neljällä perustavalla. 
Laitteiston tulee vikaantua ennustettavalla tavalla. Laitteisto arkkitehtuurin valinnalla 
voidaan välttää turvallisuuden kannalta kriittisten pullonkaulojen muodostumista. 
Oikeita toimintapoja nuodattamalla voidaan vähentää systemaattisia virheitä laitteiston 
toteutuksessa. Standardit edellyttävät V-mallin mukaista toimintamallia tuotteen 
vaatimustenmukaisuuden varmistamiseksi. V-mallin rakenteen mukainen 
dokumentaatio tarjoaa jäljitettävyyden vaatimusten ja testauksen varmentamiseen. 
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Koneenohjauksessa tyypillinen konsepti on hajautettu järjestelmä, jossa usein 
käyttöliittymä ja varsinainen ohjaus on jaettu eri yksiköihin. Käyttöliittymäyksikkö on 
sijoitettu lähelle käyttäjää ja varsinainen ohjausyksikkö on kytketty 
käyttöliittymälaitteeseen sarjaliikenneliitynnällä. Turvallisuuden varmistamiseksi 
kommunikaatio on kahdennettu ja käytetty sarjaliikenneprotokolla noudattaa CAN 
standardia. CAN standardi tarjoaa itsessään hyvin virheensietokykyisen 
kommunikaation ja kahdennus varmistaa toiminnan fyysisten virheiden varalle. 
Käyttöliittymän tehtävänä on varmistaa oikeiden käskyjen välittäminen oikea-aikaisesti 
muulle ohjausjärjestelmälle käyttäjän niin halutessa. Ohjausyksiköt valvovat 
järjestelmän tilaa ja toimintaympäristöä ja tekevät päätöksen komennon toteuttamisesta 
turvallisuuden sallimissa rajoissa.  
Järjestelmää analysoitiin ja määriteltiin turvallisuuden vaatimat eheystasot 
laitteiston toteutukselle. Tyypillisessä koneenohjausjärjestelmässä riskit liittyvät usein 
käyttäjän vaarantumiseen. Käyttäjää ja yksittäisiä sivullisia vaarantavan vikaantumiset 
vaativat jonkin verran keskimääräistä tasoa korkeampia turvallisuus eheystasoja. 
Tyypillisesti vaatimus on eheystaso kaksi. Konseptin vaatimustenmukaisuuden 
suunnitteluun ja varmistamiseen käytettiin lohkokaaviotasolla vikapuu-, vikamuoto- ja 
vaikutusanalyysejä. Komponenttitason vikamuoto-, vaikutus- ja kriittisyysanalyysillä 
(FMEDA) varmistettiin suunnitellun toteutuksen vaatimusten täyttymistä. Konseptin 
sinänsä havaittiin täyttävän perusvaatimukset hyvin, mutta tiettyjä yksityiskohtia 
erityisesti yksiköiden yhteisissä osissa tulee parantaa. 
 Järjestelmäsuunnitteluvaiheessa tulee käyttövarmuus asioita miettiä 
kokonaisuutena. Eri käyttövarmuus näkökohtien välillä syntyy ristiriitaisuuksia ja 
sovelluksen kannalta oikea katsantokanta kannattaa valita. Usein lainmukaisuus tulee 
varmistaa ja sen jälkeen kohdistaa suuntaus asiakasvaatimusten mukaan. Siirtyminen 
hallittuun turvakriittiseen järjestelmäsuunnitteluun on usein asennekysymys 
organisaatiotasolla ja teknisesti ottaen ratkaisut kannattaa pitää mahdollisimman 
yksinkertaisina! 
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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
texp     Exposure time for operator or bystander 
tavop     Average operating time  
/TOT     Total failure rate for function 
SD      Safe and detected failures 
SU      Safe and undetected failures 
DD      Dangerous and detected failures 
DU      Dangerous and undetected failures 
 
SIL  Safety Integrity Level  
SRL  Safety Requirement Level 
SFF  Safety Failure Fraction 
FMEA    Failure Mode and Effect Analysis  
FMEDA    Failure Mode, Effect and Diagnostics Analysis  
IEC  International Electro technical Commission 
ISO  International Standardization Organization 
CAN  Controller Area Network, Automotive  
ECU  Electronic Control Unit 
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer 
AgPL  Agriculture Performance Level 
PE-system /PES  Programmable Electronic System 
FIT  Failure In Time, Unit 1/10-9 h 
TFT  Thin Film Transistor, Active LCL display type 
MTTF  Mean Time To Failure 
MTBF  Mean Time Between Failure 
HMI  Human Machine Interface 
CPU  Central Processing Unit 
UML  Unified Modeling Language 
QM  Quality assurance Measures 
QS  Quality system 
UML  Unified Modeling Language 
V-model Development model based on Verification and 
Validation (V figure) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Requirement for highly dependable machinery control system is growing from 
increased complexity of control systems and their ability to control critical machinery 
functions. This has been noticed by legal authorities and governing legislation is 
becoming effective. New machinery directive 2006/42/EC for EU addresses electronic 
control systems in machinery. [11] New machinery directive was supposed to be 
applicable from beginning of 2010, but it is postponed for two years according to 
Official Journal of European Union. [20] Industry specific guideline standards for 
electronic controls are under development and partly released already. IEC 61508 forms 
a baseline for industry specific standards. Industry specific standards ISO 25119 
(Agriculture and forestry machines) and ISO 15998 (Construction equipment) give 
implementation guidelines for methods introduced in baseline standard. Tool and 
methods provided by ISO 25119 are used widely in this study, since they fit well to 
machinery control applications. 
Legal requirements can be met by using methodology based on adequate 
functional safety standards. Standards require certain tools and methods for product life 
cycle planning and implementation. Development and operational work flow shall be 
adapted to fulfill those requirements. Main focus in the study is to interpret standard 
requirements to process changes and to understand basic philosophy for reliable 
programmable system hardware. Usage of tools and methods is tested and demonstrated 
with machinery-control-system concept development. 
Dependable control system provides continuously correct service for customer 
without hazardous consequences to people or public. System should be also maintained 
and modified in controlled manor. Dependability should be seen as built in feature for 
product development, manufacturing and operation phases. Dependability is based on 
failure avoidance and control. Failures can be qualified to two groups. Firstly there are 
failures which occur randomly and consequences of those failures should be controlled 
and effects minimized. Second failure category is systematic failures arising from wide 
range of causes. Avoidance of failures can be divided to four basic categories. Random 
failures should be controlled in proper manner. System should fail predictably and as 
planned and hardware architecture should avoid bottlenecks in system. Systematic 
errors shall be avoided with proper work flow.  
 Development of a new system starts with high level analysis and is focused to 
find links and chains between causes, failures and consequences. Discovered risks shall 
be quantified on their potentiality to harm people or environment. There is always a 
probability of catastrophic consequences, but likelihood should be in tolerable region 
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compared to every day risks. System level analysis is based on failure mode and effect 
studies and usage of fault tree modeling helps to understand links between events. 
Systems level phase sets goals for integrity targets realized with implemented system. 
During design and realizations phase of the product life cycle detailed analysis of 
implemented devices provide evidence of achieved integrity levels. Reliability oriented 
development process and proper work flow in every step of product lifecycle will lead 
to reduced number of systematic failures. V-model based development process is highly 
recommended to provide feedback between requirements and testing evidence. 
Structured work methods and specifications provide good traceability between 
requirements and testing. 
 Typical system concept for machinery control is distributed system. Human 
interface device is located near operator and control unit is connected with serial 
interface to it. Communication redundancy is needed and two separate CAN lines 
provide needed protection against communication errors. Human interface device 
verifies that correct command is transmitted to system and it was intended to be 
commanded. ECU shall monitor system stage and operational conditions and makes 
decision to implement command only when it is safe. Safety integrity targets were 
analyzed and set after system level analysis. Results from Fault tree and Failure mode, 
effect and criticality (FMEDA) analysis indicated that concept fulfills requirements 
quite well, but on detail level diagnostics should be improved especially on common 
parts. Focus of dependability should be considered in the beginning of each project, 
since there is some trade offs between different dependability attributes.  
Study is focused to methods and concepts related to hardware dependability. 
Software is equally important part of development project, but methods for software 
dependability differs significantly from hardware methods and due to space and time 
limitations software is left outside of the study scope. Chapter 2 represents overall life 
cycle concept and basic terminology related to control systems in hazardous systems. 
Dependability and safety should be seen as product life cycle challenge instead of just 
engineering task. Life cycle is illustrated as a background information for deeper 
analyze of electronic unit development. Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate to theory and 
interpretation of safety standard requirements. Chapter 5 gives implementation 
examples of tools and methods to achieve related requirements. Chapters 6 and 7 
illustrate usage of tools and analyze results from concept machinery control system.  
Document is intended to serve as a handbook for engineers working with safety 
projects in Parker Vansco. Other goal was to starts analysis of safe distributed 
machinery control system concept. Material related to concept analysis could serve as a 
technical sales material for future projects. In the end my personal goal is to develop 
skills to be able make high quality engineering work efficiently and in that sense 
methodology described in study works for all kind of products! 
2. DEPENDABLE CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Control system main feature is ability to control, protect or monitor process or 
equipment based on information flowing in from system input. System consists 
normally from several parts and all parts must fulfill safety related requirements. [8] 
Safety system analysis includes sensors, actuators, interface devices and communication 
media as well as logic subsystems as in Figure 1. Quest for higher dependability can be 
started from design reliability analysis. Modern functional safety standards provide a 
good starting point. For example IEC 61508 addresses electrical, electronic, 
programmable electronic systems. [1]  
 
 
Figure 1 Basic electronic control system [8] 
2.1. Dependability 
Successful product development needs wider perspective than just safety legislation. 
Overall dependability on system level must be high to achieve high customer 
expectations. Safety is needed to be able to sell products, but dependability can be used 
as a sales argument. Dependability can be categorized as Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Concept of dependability according to Avizienis [6] 
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Attributes for dependability can be described as a collective term from availability, 
reliability, safety, integrity and maintainability. Definition of integrity includes also the 
term confidentiality in a sense of fail safe operation. Original equipment manufacturers 
(OEM) are responsible to system level reliability and safety. Suppliers mainly build 
devices and subsystems according specifications and targeted reliability and safety 
levels. Parker Vansco as a hardware supplier to OEM’s takes responsibility of hardware 
subsystem or device realization phase. Study will be focused mainly to techniques and 
processes needed in that phase, although it is important to understand reliability and 
safety on the system level.  
 
Widely accepted definitions for terms are as follows [2, 5, 6]: 
 
“Availability -  readiness for correct service” 
“Reliability -  continuity of correct service” 
“Safety - absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the 
environment” 
“Integrity -  absence of improper system alteration” 
“Maintainability -  ability to undergo modifications and repairs” [15] 
 
In most cases availability, reliability and safety follow each other. Lately focus has been 
paid to safety aspects of control systems. Techniques adopted to safety analysis are 
actually used earlier in availability analysis. Safety aspects have brought more rigors to 
application of these techniques.[2] Study is concentrating to safety related system 
requirements, but same analysis address all five aspects of dependability. Focus of 
dependability should be considered in the beginning of each project, since there is some 
trade offs between different dependability attributes. 
Means for improved dependability can be divided to three different areas. Three 
main areas cover whole life cycle of the product. In chronologic order they are design of 
system, manufacturing of system and operation of system. All three areas have different 
points of focus.  
 
Design: 
• Less complexity 
• Redundancy where needed 
• Stress factor overrating  
• Testing of design and reviewing of design work 
• Feedback based improvements during design iteration 
 
Manufacturing: 
• Control of materials, methods and changes 
• Control of work methods and standards 
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Operation: 
• Adequate user documentation 
• Failure feedback from field 
• Early involvement in systematic field failures 
 
Threats for dependability are failures. They can be divided to two major categories. In 
all systems there is always risk of random events. Random failures cannot be prevented, 
but effects of random failures should be controlled on sufficient level. Second failure 
mode is systematic failures arising from life cycle activities. Systematic failures can be 
addressed with careful planning throughout design and operation. [2] 
2.2. What is functional safety? 
IEC 61508 defines safety as freedom from unacceptable risk of damage. Damage can be 
injury or threat to life. Also severe damages to environment and property must be 
considered as a safety issue. Functional safety is part of the overall safety that depends 
on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs. [8] Functional 
safety can be described in other words as active safety. For example overall fire safety 
in house consists from several aspects. Brick walls are inherently safer than timber 
walls. Wall material is not anyway considered as functional safety. Installation of fire 
alarm devices to house can be seen as an improvement of functional safety, because fire 
alarm device reduces risks related to occupants. Also for example sprinkler systems 
would be considered as functional safety, since it has main task to limit damage to 
property. [1] 
2.3. Cause, Failure, Consequence and Risk 
To be able understand safety related analysis and mechanisms, one should consider 
difference in terms cause, failure, consequence and risk. Those terms are widely used in 
dependability and safety analysis. They form a chain of events in equipment under 
control and inside control system. [2] 
 Cause is the reason for failure in system. Causes can wary from environmental 
stresses to random effects in one component. Three main categories for causes are 
common causes like environmental stresses effecting whole system, systematic causes 
rising from engineering misunderstandings and random causes having impact only on 
certain parts of the system. [2] 
 Failures can be either physical or logical. They can be categorized as threats. 
Sometimes causes and failures are difficult to separate. For example in random 
component failure cause is random. In most cases probably some manufacturing and 
material tolerances are causing particular component to fail on specific time, but chain 
between specific cause and failure can be modeled only statistically. [2] 
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 Consequence is what happens when failure occurs. When this consequence is 
directed to people, environment or property, it is often called as hazard. Consequence 
can be also another failure cause in the system. [2] 
 Risk is probability for realization of certain consequence. Risk is used in wider 
context as a total probability of hazardous consequences or as a probability to specific 
failure. Sometimes probability to specific failure can be called as occurrence. [2] 
In most cases causes and consequences form chain reaction which will 
eventually lead to hazard. For example high ambient temperature may cause component 
failures in electronic modules. Component failures may lead to malfunction in 
operation. Malfunction in functional safety system is often hazardous. Functional safety 
systems often address those chain reactions and uses bypassing to avoid hazards. For 
example having two fire alarm devices in house is reducing risk of malfunction greatly! 
[1] 
2.4. Tolerable risk 
Functional safety standards start from the idea, that zero risk is unachievable. Also costs 
related to achieving lower risk levels tend to rise exponentially. Risks levels should be 
decreased to acceptable level to user and public. It is widely accepted that risk level for 
user can be higher than for the public. [2] IEC 61508 introduces safety integrity levels 
1-4 with statistical risk levels introduced in Table 1. Risk levels refer to different levels 
of hazardous consequences to people. Levels 1-2 are mainly targeted for systems 
causing hazards to very few people and levels 3-4 are used in systems capable of 
harming multiple individuals. [8] 
 
Table 1 Tolerable risk levels for systems causing possible hazard to people [8] 
Safety integrity level 
(SIL) 
High demand rate 
(Dangerous failures / hr) 
Low demand rate 
(Probability of failure on 
demand ) 
4 10-9 to < 10-8 10-5 to < 10-4 
3 10-8 to < 10-7 10-4 to < 10-3 
2 10-7 to < 10-6 10-3 to < 10-2 
1 10-6 to < 10-5 10-2 to < 10-1 
 
Two columns are inherently the same. If failure in system (high demand) is once a year, 
figures end up to be equal. SIL level classification is based on failure potential to harm 
one or several people. For example nuclear power plant is allowed to plow up once in 
100 000 years, since SIL4 is widely used in nuclear industry. On the other hand in 
construction machines only the user is exposed to hazard in most cases. Machine is also 
inherently quite safe due to safe cabins and slow speed. IEC 15998 indicate that in most 
cases SIL2 is adequate. [10] Statistically in worst case machine can fail hazardously 
once in 100 years in operation. Although there is no serious injury or death to people 
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always related to failure. Let say that every tenth hazard causes serious injury and 
machine is operated 8 hours daily. Serious injury will happen in worst case once in 3000 
years. 3,3 *10-4 can be seen as a tolerable risk level for operator. In comparison Smith 
presents, that average risk for all deadly accidents in mid life is once in 5000 years. [1] 
Figures are rough ballpark values, but reason behind values in standard can be seen. In 
modern society smoking is considered as intolerable risk, but traffic is in tolerable 
region due to its benefits as in Figure 3. Risk for smoker to get deadly cancer is over 
one per mille in one year which is considered not worth of risk. Tolerable risk level for 
individual people is highly dependant from ideas and opinions. For example some 
people tend to think that risk from smoking is in tolerable region.  
 
 
Figure 3 Tolerable risk level illustration 
2.5. Product life cycle approach 
According to IEC 61508 life cycle approach should be used in design and 
manufacturing of safety related systems [8]. Smith provides insight in to the life cycle 
model (Figure 4). Model should be adjusted to fulfill the needs of specific industry and 
company. Main idea behind life cycle approach is to record all events and failures 
during whole life cycle and react based on recorded data. [1]  
In the Life cycle and System level scope phase high level safety plan shall be 
created. Main idea is to build up understanding of the system/equipment under control. 
Hazard identification should be made with proper techniques to discover all external 
and internal hazardous situations. [2] 
System level risk analysis includes identification of hazards. Those shall be 
analyzed with relevant techniques to reveal potential risks to environment, users and 
public. Often failures cause multiple consequences and hazards. All risks are analyzed 
in quantified manner to be able to set risk levels. [2] During system level safety 
requirements and allocation maximum tolerable risk levels shall be set for the system. 
Overall safety integrity level will be assigned. All safety functions shall be identified 
and what failures are covered by those functions. All safety functions are classified to 
adequate safety integrity level. Safety system concept shall be created. [2]  
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System level planning should address whole life cycle of the product. Target is 
to guarantee safe operation in all life cycle phases. Plans should address also non 
technical issue like human errors and avoidance of those. It is important to understand 
what can be improved in the future and what lessons can be learned from the past 
experience. [2] 
In the Unit design and Verification phase actual safety system or subsystems 
shall be designed, manufactured and build. Units shall be verified to fulfill all 
requirements related to safety and non-safety operation. Design phase should fulfill 
requirements set by related safety standard. Often phase can be seen as a project inside 
project and in some cases it can be a recursive project inside system level project. 
Especially custom made safety systems have their own life cycle inside system life 
cycle. Realization phase structure depends highly from industry and technological 
aspects. Most modern control systems include electronics and software running inside 
electronics. They are cross functional complex systems. [2] From that point of view V- 
model based design process is widely used and recognized by current standards. [9] In 
verification part subsystem or unit shall be tested to fulfill all safety and non safety 
functions. Verification should address all requirements and features and traceability 
must clear between specifications and test results. Structured documentation methods 
are a main method to demonstrate traceability requirements. [2] 
System installation and integration phase includes build according to plans.  
Special attention should be paid on recording all events and especially failures. In case 
of serial productions, proper methods of pilot patch validation and field testing shall be 
applied. Also change management applies after start of production. [2] System 
validation shall be done according to validation plans. Validation should cover all 
aspects of the safety system. All test reports shall be reviewed and reviews documented. 
Revalidation should be carried out regularly to check recorded data during product life 
cycle. [2] 
Operation, maintenance and modifications phase shall follow planned flow. 
Logs should be maintained and especially failures noted with adequate rigor. 
Modifications and redesign shall be made when necessary or safety targets are not 
achieved. Special attention shall be paid to field failure analysis. System documentation 
shall include maintenance schedule and instructions. Maintenance planning should be 
flexible and preventive maintenance is highly recommended. [2] 
If decommissioning causes hazards to user, public or environment, those issues 
should be addressed in system safety planning. In many cases decommissioning can 
cause mainly possible environmental waste hazards, but also recycling should be 
planned for system life cycle. Quite often life time of subsystems is shorter than lifetime 
of the full system. Maintenance, modifications and decommissioning are more recursive 
than sequential phases in system life cycle model. In some cases decommissioning can 
be one of the most hazardous phases. For example in nuclear power plants 
decommissioning is major cost and risk. [1] 
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Figure 4 Control system lifecycle [1] 
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Table 2 describes deliverables from different life cycle phases. These deliverables are 
highly recommended by safety standards. [1] During process audits and assessments 
deliverables are of the great interest.  
 
Table 2 Deliverables from product life cycle [ 1] 
Life cycle & System level scope 
  
Safety plan 
  Hazard identification documents 
System level risk analyses 
  
Risk analyses documents 
  Safety concept including safety function descriptions 
  Risk targets for system, subsystems and safety functions 
System level planning 
  
Installation instructions 
  Validation plans 
  User instructions 
  
 Failure and operational log plans 
Unit design and verification 
  
Subsystem safety plan 
  Structured product documents 
  Pilot products 
  Quantitative analyses of failure modes 
  Verification plans 
  Verification results 
System installation and integration and validation 
  
Installation logs 
  Validation review documents 
  Created event and modification logs for operation and maintenance phase 
Operation, maintenance and modifications 
  
Maintained event logs 
  Maintained user manuals & maintenance instructions 
 
 
 
3. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Target of this paragraph is to provide general understanding of system level risk 
analysis. System level analysis shall be made by product OEM. Suppliers mainly need 
to fulfill requirements based on system level analysis. Risk assessment starts from target 
system analysis. When starting to think how requirements should be fulfilled in most 
rigorous way, causes for earlier faults should be analyzed. IEC16508 emphasizes 
lifecycle approach.  Lessons learned from past shall be analyzed and results 
implemented to next generation systems. [8] 
 
Typical error sources in complex system according to Smith: 
• Random faults of hardware 
• Faults in power supply system 
• Environmental influences  
• Human errors 
• Systematic design flows 
• Common cause failures 
• Missing specification 
• Wrong specification [1] 
 
Figure 5 implicates, that major focus should be paid on specifications of any project 
phase. Also change management plays important role in avoidance of failures, although 
this study does not cover change management in detail. By knowing most error sources 
realization phase can be focused to avoid those errors, although as stated earlier zero 
failures is unrealistic goal. 
 
Figure 5 Primary causes for control system failures [4] 
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ISO 25199 describes workflow for risk analysis. First step is to have accurate system 
description and understanding of it. Next step is to discover surrounding conditions for 
target system. All operational states and conditions shall be derived from system 
descriptions. Preferred method is to make state flowcharts and transition tables. From 
this information a list of failures can be created. [9] 
3.1. System failure analysis and integrity targets 
Risk table approach can be used to analysis system failures as in Table 3. In risk table 
approach failures shall given classification according their severity, exposure and 
controllability. All listed failures shall be quantified according to all three main 
categories. Classification shall be documented as in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 Failure classification table [9]  
Failure Severity Exposure Controllability 
Failure 1 S2 E3 C3 
Failure 2  S3 E2 C2 
Failure N S2 E3 C3 
 
Severity analysis is focused to hazards directed to people. Severity classification should 
take operators and bystanders into account. Severity is based on most likely scenario 
and relevant operating conditions. Severity classification is divided to four categories 
based on potential harm to people as in Table 4: 
 
Table 4 Failure severity classification [9] 
S0 S1 S2 S3 
No injuries Light & moderate 
injuries 
Severe & life 
threatening 
injuries 
Fatal injuries 
 
Exposure classification is based on probability of harmful failures implicating operator 
or bystander. Variable E is an estimation of how often or how long people are exposed 
to the hazard. Also the effect of operating conditions shall be taken into account. For 
example sliding on ice is only possible during winter. Five exposure categories quantify 
probability like in Table 5: 
 
Table 5 Failure exposure classification [9] 
E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 
< 0,01% 0,1% < 1% < 10% > 10% 
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Exposure can be expressed with following equation: 
 
avopt
t
Exposure exp=     (1) 
Where: 
texp is exposure time by operator or bystander 
tavop is average operating time for function in question 
 
Controllability is assessment of possible avoidance of harm by operator or bystander. If 
operator or bystander can easily prevent harmful situation, failure can be classifies as 
easily controllable. In the case of total loss of operator control or if failure cannot be 
noticed by operator or bystander failure it is classified as uncontrollable. For example 
jamming of gas pedal can be controlled easily by engine shutdown in vehicle. Four 
categories for controllability are as in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Failure controllability classification [9] 
C0 C1 C2 C3 
Easily controllable: 
Operator or 
bystander can avoid 
harm with usual 
skills 
Controllable:  
The harm is almost 
always avoided , 
even for distracted 
operators or 
bystanders 
Generally 
controllable: 
Generally, the 
average operators 
or bystanders can 
avoid the harm 
Non controllable: 
The average 
operators or 
bystanders cannot 
generally avoid the 
harm 
 
ISO 25119 presents risk graph approach as one method to evaluate needed safety 
integrity level from failure classification lists. For example failure 1 in Table 3 with 
severity level S2 starts from line S2. Exposure rating E3 leads to fourth line in S2 
category. Failure has little controllability and therefore it goes to last column with C3 
controllability rating. From Figure 6 can be read that safety integrity level required for 
particular failure is agriculture safety performance level (AgPL) c. 
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Figure 6 Selection table for agriculture equipment safety integrity level [9] 
 
Key: 
S = Severity, 
E = Exposure to the hazardous event, 
C = Controllability, 
QM = Quality assurance measures, 
a, b, c, d, e = Required Agricultural Performance Level (AgPLr). 
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3.2. Selecting proper solution for implementation 
System level planning is task for OEM, but suppliers should understand system also 
quite well to be able to make good solutions for implementation. Specification of 
system failures and operational modes gives good base for estimation requests or 
quotation. Selecting a proper implementation is then a task for supplier.  
 
Selection of implementation needs two basic inputs: 
• Overall safety integrity level requirement 
• Safe state requirement 
 
Table 7 sets requirement for hardware implementation based on AgPL level. Letter B 
and number from 1- to 3 describes required safety integrity level. Numbers are 
comparable to IEC 61508 SIL levels. [8] B stands for good engineering practice. 
Requirement in ISO 25119 is called software requirement level (SRL). Requirement 
refers to qualitative methods used in design. Mean time to fail (MTTF) set target for 
dangerous failure rates in one channel of system. Selection of higher reliability 
hardware architecture allows using lower level on systematic failure avoidance. [9] For 
example if one continues example with Table 3 failure 1, agriculture performance level 
c can be implemented with categories 1 to 4. By selecting category 2 software 
requirement level shall be 1, which is easier to achieve than level 2. 
 
Table 7 ISO 25119 implementation selection table [9] 
Agriculture 
performance level CatB Cat1 Cat2 Cat3 Cat4 
a 1 B B B B 
b 2 1 B B B 
c   2 1 1 1 
d       2 2 
e         3 
      
 MTTF = low <30 000 FIT   
  MTTF = medium <10 000 FIT   
  MTTF = high < 3 000 FIT   
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3.3. Risks assessment summary 
After risk assessment requirements for hardware and software shall be documented. 
Hardware concept design starts from selected category solution and concept shall be 
described in detail. Testing and design documentation shall give evidence of 
requirement fulfillment. 
 
According to ISO 25119 requirements for technical safety concept are: 
• operational states 
• safe states for all subsystems 
• power up and down conditions including reset 
• Reasonable unusual operational states 
• Failure rates for channels and system 
• Category requirements 
• Failure diagnostic requirements according to category [9] 
 
4. FOUR WAYS TO DECREASE RISK 
Failure avoidance measures can be categorized to four sectors. Requirements are 
divided to qualitative and quantitative groups by their nature.  Rigor of requirements 
differs between safety integrity levels, but main ideas are same.  In this study focus is on 
SIL2 level requirements. All four parts in Figure 7 have equal weight. If any of the part 
of the puzzle is missing, product does not fulfill any safety integrity level. 
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Figure 7 Four major requirements on way to improved safety 
4.1.1. Qualitative requirements 
Qualitative requirements address needs to avoid systematic failures. Systematic failures 
in IEC 61508 are addressed with two general requirements for all steps in development 
and design. Firstly all work must be planned and documented, secondly all work and 
documentation should be well structured and unambiguous. [8] 
 
Avoiding systematic failure: 
• Systematic and structural approach 
• Verification step by step 
• Planning and project management 
• Good documentation in every step 
• Good understanding from operational environment 
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Control of systematic failures: 
• Control of operational environment 
• Fault diagnostics in system 
• Testing 
o EMC 
o Environmental stress testing 
o Destructive and over the limit testing 
4.1.2. Design and development process features 
ISO 25119 strongly suggest use of V-model based development work flow. [9] 
According to Haikala main benefits are minimized project risk, improved quality, 
reduction of life cycle cost and improved communication. Safety and reliability 
improvements are achieved mainly from improved quality and improved 
communication. Standardized development and strong structural approach make 
responsibilities more clear between project stakeholders. [3] 
V-model emphasizes requirements driven process. Traceability must be seen as 
a two way street. (Figure 8) All requirements must be covered by at least one design 
element. Design elements must be linked to acceptance test. On the other hand all 
design elements must be based on at least one requirement. This ensures that 
implementation features are sufficient, but no extra features are included. Testing flow 
follows definition flow and requirements on certain level shall be verified on 
corresponding level. [9] 
 
Figure 8 System design V-model [9] 
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Figure 9 Hardware design V-model [9] 
 
System design V-model divides to two parallel processes in realization phase. One side 
is for hardware design (Figure 9) and the other side for software. Two parallel processes 
have quite a lot cross-references and trade offs. Requirements between software and 
hardware section must be linked to each other. Figure 9 describes hardware design V-
model. Software V-model is omitted, since it is quite similar and focus in study is in 
hardware requirements. [9] 
4.1.3. Specifications  
According to Smith specification should be well structured and structured design 
techniques implemented. Second requirement is unambiguousness of requirements. In 
modern control systems safety and control functions are often embedded to each other. 
Special attention should be paid to isolation between safety and non-safety functions. 
All data and electrical interfaces between safety systems and non-safety system should 
be tightly defined. If clear isolation is not possible, whole control system has to be 
safety critical. [1] 
 Main requirement for specification notation is to be clear, univocal and 
verifiable. For safety SIL 1 and 2 informal methods are adequate. In most cases natural 
language specification is used with explanatory support from semiformal modeling 
techniques. Attention should be paid to achieve adequate unambiguousness when using 
natural language. Semiformal methods are preferred for example by IEC61508. [8] 
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Logic diagrams, data dictionaries, data flow diagrams and truth tables are examples of 
semi formal methods suitable for specifications. [3] 
ISO 25119 gives guidelines for documentation. Documentation follows closely 
structured design model. Specification model emphasizes linking of test cases to 
appropriate level requirements. Also tracking between subsequent specification levels is 
important. [9] Requirement specifications implicate what shall be implemented. 
Technical concept specifies how hardware implementation will fulfill higher level 
requirements.  
 
Coverage for safety specification: 
• Safety integrity level requirement 
• Safety function requirements 
• Safety system architecture 
• Operating modes and performance 
• External interface description 
• Environmental requirements 
 
According to Haikala specification phase is most important part of the project, since 
specification mistakes are hard to discover and they tend to be costly. Ideal specification 
has full coverage, high accuracy, total unambiguousness, testability and tracking 
without any mistakes. I real life ideal specification is impossible, because some 
requirements above have contrary effects. [3]  
4.2. Quantitative analyze of random failures 
Hardware random faults should be analyzed on detailed level. Proper documentation 
includes evidence from random failure calculations and analysis coverage. Statistical 
analyze is based on reliability data of each component and in most cases single failures 
will be covered. Single failure leading to other one is calculated as single failure. Two 
simultaneous non-connected failures are calculated as unlikely. Failure Modes Effects 
and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA) address failure rate and diagnostic coverage 
requirements. [2] 
 
Control of random faults calls for three basic requirements [8]: 
• Dangerous failure rate less than specified for particular integrity level. 
• Safe failure fraction better than required for particular integrity level. 
• Common cause failure control. 
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4.2.1. Failure rate 
Failure rates can be calculated for subsystems and blocks as in Figure 10 and then 
combined for different safety channels. During the concept stage failure rates can be 
estimated for blocks and overall failure rate estimates can be made to verify concept. 
Also individual targets for realized blocks shall be set for detailed design. After detailed 
design failure rate verification can be done on component level. [2] 
 
 
Figure 10 Basic PE-system 
 
PE-system failure rate: 
 
OLITOT λλλλ ++=     (2) 
 
Where: 
 is failure rate per time unit 
 
Used units are [1/h] or more often [FIT] (1 FIT = 10-9/h). Also Mean Time to Failure 
(MTTF) is used. MTTF is reciprocal value of the failure rate . Failure rate is easier to 
use in calculations, since values can be simply added together to calculate system failure 
rate. [2] 
 
λ
1
=MTTF      (3)     
4.2.2. Safe failure fraction  
There is two simple ways to improve failure behavior of system. Design should be made 
in a way that most failures lead to safe state on system level. Secondly fast detection of 
failures and proper reaction to them is critical. According to IEC 61508 dangerous 
failure rate is critical factor. Failure classification divided to two issues. If failure is 
causing system level safety hazard, it is counted as dangerous failure. Otherwise failures 
are safe ones. If failure can be detected, it is detectable. Rest of failures is marked 
undetectable. In the end only dangerous undetected failures are really dangerous, if 
system can be put to safe state after failure detection without hazard to user or public 
(Figure 11). 
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Overall failure rate: 
 
DUDDSUSDTOT λλλλλ +++=   (4)  
 
Where: 
 SD is safe and detected failures 
 SU is safe and undetected failures 
DD is dangerous and detected failures 
DU is dangerous and undetected failures 
 
 
Figure 11 Safe failure fraction classification 
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Where: 
 SFF is safe failure fraction 
 
IEC 61508 dangerous failure rate requirements are introduced in Table 8. [8] Standard 
requires SFF to be over certain limits in corresponding integrity level. With complex 
control systems type B requirements should be used, since there is always some 
uncertainty in behavior under fault conditions. 
 
Table 8 Safe failure fraction requirements for type B systems [8]    
Hardware fault tolerance Safe failure 
fraction 0 1 2 
<60%     (low) Not allowed SIL1 SIL2 
60-90%  (medium) SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 
90-99%  (high) SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 
>99% SIL3 SIL4 SIL4 
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Normal machinery control systems do not implement full redundancy. At least some 
parts of logic system and power supplies are common. Due to that, hardware fault 
tolerance is 0 in most cases. In practice safe failure fraction should be over 90% in most 
systems.  
4.2.3. Common cause failure 
According to IEC61508 hardware related common cause failures arise mainly from two 
causes. Random hardware failures and systematic failures are two main causes for 
common cause failures. [8] Both causes are addressed by other requirements also, but 
common cause analysis address cross linked effects between different channels in 
redundant or partly redundant systems. Random failures occur randomly over time. 
Therefore possibility of two simultaneous failures in redundant channels exists, but 
probability of simultaneous failures is magnitudes lower than probability of one failure. 
[2] 
 More important factors for simultaneous failures are related design parameters. 
For example if cooling is inefficient, both redundant channels might fail due to over 
heating. It is still quite unlikely to happen at the same time in both channels. In 
electronic systems diagnostic coverage can be quite high and failure can be detected 
before second failure. Cycle time of diagnostic functions is important and must be 
adequate for system and common cause failure mechanisms. [2]  
 
 
 
Figure 12 Common cause failure concept  
 
According to IEC61508 there is three major ways to be taken to reduce the probability 
of dangerous common cause failures: 
 
• Reduce the number of random hardware and systematic failures overall. 
• Channel independence should be maximized. 
• Fast discovery of single failures [8] 
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Smith implicates that systematic approach in analyzing of reliability data starts with 
block diagram level of system and continues with fault three analysis. Good tool for 
reducing especially dangerous random failures is FMEDA and fault tree analysis. [2] 
Common mode failures can be quantified with statistical data or by analyzing design 
features with quantified checklists. ISO 25119 provides a simplified method to analyze 
common cause failures. Used method is score card in table format. Score card should be 
used as checkbox. Either result is full score or zero. Approximately one third of the 
score is related to system concept design. Second third addresses training and 
competence of personnel of the design company. Last 35% is dedicated to 
environmental testing rigor. Score from Table 9 should be over 65%. Otherwise 
additional measures should be applied. More detailed tables can be found on IEC 61508 
[8]. 
 
Table 9 Common cause estimation score card 
No. Measure against CCF Score MAX % 
1 Separation / segmentation  
 Physical separation between signal and power paths? 15 
2 Diversity  
 Different technologies/design or physical principles applied?  20 
3 Design / application / experience  
3.1 Protection against over-voltage, over-pressure, over-current 15 
3.2 Selected components are successful proven for several years 
under consideration of environmental conditions? 
5 
4 Assessment / analysis  
 Are the results of a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 
taken 
into account to avoid common cause failures in design? 
5 
5 Competence / training  
 Are designers/ technicians trained to understand the causes and 
consequences of common cause failures? 
5 
6 Environmental  
6.1 EMC  
 Has the system been checked for EMC-aspects (e.g. as 
specified 
in relevant product standards)? 
25 
6.2 Other influences  
 Are the requirements for immunity to all relevant environmental 
influences like, temperature, shock, vibration, humidity (e.g. as 
specified in relevant standards e.g. ISO 15003) considered? 
10 
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4.3. Architectural constrains 
Standards describe typical architectures for safety systems. For example ISO 25119 
specifies 5 architectures for safety critical vehicle systems. Architectures differ from 
monitoring and redundancy point of view. Architectures are called as hardware 
categories. In addition standard emphasizes the need for certain measures for all 
architectures. Design should implement adequate separation to avoid short circuits. 
Over dimensioning of components should take place when reasonable. Failure mode 
control should be made with special care. Cross effects between blocks should be 
analyzed and isolated. Using of well tried solutions on component and block level is 
highly recommended. [9] 
Categories B and 1 (Figure 13) can be used typically in places where severe injury can 
happen seldom and operator will most probably avoid hazard anyway. In the other 
words failure in safety function should not lead directly to catastrophic consequences.  
[9] In categories B and 1 single failure can lead to loss of safety function and they are 
not suitable for single point fail operation systems. Category 1 has higher MTTF than B. 
Diagnostic coverage in both categories is reasonably low, 1 has higher coverage than B. 
 
Properties: 
• Inputs and outputs have little or no fault detection. 
• Diagnostic coverage is from low to medium 
• MTTF for channel varies from low (B) to medium (1) 
• Redundant channels or inputs might be required to achieve safe state. 
• Consideration of common cause failure is not relevant 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Category B and 1 system 
 
Category 2 (Figure 14) can be used in places where loss of function does not directly 
lead severe hazard. For example in systems where wrong function could lead to hazard, 
but no function is considered safe state. Special attention shall be paid to cycle times of 
diagnostic testing to ensure proper reaction during failure state. Automated testing is 
preferred, but also manual test routines are allowed. System should maintain safe state 
until failure is cleared. [9] In category 2 implementation safety function might be lost 
due to single fail, but safe state is achieved. Test equipment can be external or internal 
to the unit. Adequate measures to avoid failures conveying from one side to another 
shall be implemented. Category 2 implementation cannot be used single point failure 
systems. 
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Properties: 
• Input and output failures are detected in logic elements. 
• Diagnostic coverage for device is medium. 
• MTTF for channel is from low to medium 
• Redundant channels or inputs might be required to achieve safe state. 
• Consideration of common cause failure is not relevant 
• Output configuration to be arranged in adequate way to avoid hazard in all 
situations. 
• In most cases operator needs to be warned about failure. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Category 2 system 
 
Category 3 (Figure 15) device can perform safety function even during single failure 
situation. Category 3 devices can be used single point failure operational systems when 
adequate power supply schemes are implemented. Proper channel isolation should be 
implemented to avoid domino effects. 
 
Properties: 
• Input and output failures are detected in logic elements. 
• Diagnostic coverage for device is medium. 
• MTTF for channel is from low to medium. 
• Redundant inputs might be required to achieve safe state. 
• Redundant outputs might be required to achieve safe state. 
• Common cause failures should be taken into account 
• Output configuration to be arranged in adequate way to avoid hazard in all 
situations. 
• In most cases operator need to be warned about failure. 
 
Special measures should be made to avoid hazardous failure after single failure 
situation. Operator should get warning and service request made. Also risk for 
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additional failures shall be included to design calculations and reduced functionality 
operation limits set. Diagnostic test cycle and periodic proof testing shall be defined. [9] 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Category 3 system 
 
Category 4 is similar to Cat3 from functional point of view, but needs more rigor in 
design work and higher reliability. Output monitoring coverage should be higher and 
MTTF shall be higher than in category 3. 
4.4. System behavior on fault detection 
System behavior under failure condition shall ensure safe state for system until failure 
condition is removed. First major consideration is, if system or subsystem is failure 
tolerant or non failure tolerant. In failure tolerant systems continued operation is 
allowed during predetermined repair time. Unless repaired in allowed time, switch to 
safe state is required. Non-fault tolerant systems shall be driven to safe state or low 
demand rate operation is allowed during repair time. Low demand rate operation calls 
for additional safety measures. For example manual operation can be allowed during 
repair time. [2] 
In general most mobile ground systems do not have fixed repair times and 
therefore repair time shall be assumed as infinite. Sometimes reduced operation is 
needed and it might even be safer than no operation in some cases. For example a main 
engine in marine environment shall be operational under almost any condition. System 
design shall be made in a way to allow needed low demand operational modes like 
manual operation. In addition repair time in marine environment can be arranged to be 
quite short with on board spares for electronic systems. In general design considerations 
should be as simple possible to avoid specification mistakes under failure conditions. 
Most of the systems should be designed to be safe under reset or off conditions. In 
electronic systems reset is quite often most reliable and easy way to ensure defined state 
for electronic subsystems 
5. MODELING TOOLS 
Fault tree can be used to model failure mode logics and also to estimate system failure 
rates based on known start events. They are often modeling failure of one system block. 
Failure rate analysis is intuitive from fault tree. When doing failure rate analysis with 
fault tree, common cause failure modes should be taken into account. Common cause 
should be taken into account only in redundant channels. [13] Fault tree is a system 
level modeling tool and proposed failure rate goals can be tested for system. 
Verification of block level failure rates should be done on component level and failures 
analyzed in detail with failure mode and effect analysis. Also diagnostic coverage and 
criticality should be analyzed. (FMEDA) [13] 
5.1. Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree is a graphical method to describe combinations of events leading to an end 
event in the top of the tree. Fault tree method is based on using two main logical 
configurations OR and AND gate. In addition also voted gates can be used. [13] Gates 
in Figure 16 work as basic logic gates. They can have as many inputs as need and as 
many series levels as necessary to achieve top event. Basic AND gate latches event 
trough only when all inputs are active. OR gate latches event trough when any input is 
active. Start events and result boxes are end points of the chain.[13] 
 
 #
          
 
Figure 16 fault tree basic gates  
 
Both voting gates in Figure 17 end up producing same results. Both forms are used in 
literature. Smith uses voting AND and voting or is used in other reference. In both cases 
output is true, if required amount of inputs are true. For example in Figure 17 output is 
true, if two inputs out of three are true. [13] 
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Figure 17 fault tree voting gates 
 
Equation to calculate failure rate after AND gate: 
 
21 * λλλ =and      (6) 
 
Equation to calculate failure rate after OR gate: 
 
ccandtot λλλ +=     (7) 
 
Figure 18 describes basic example of fault tree structure and illustrates the effect of 
common cause failure. Common cause failure has major impact to overall failure rate, 
since OR causes summation of failure rates instead of multiplying them. Basic statistical 
calculations can be applied. 
 
 
Figure 18 Example of fault tree failure rate analysis 
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5.2. Failure mode and effect analysis 
Analysis can be made on different levels. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) can 
be made on block level during concept phase to estimate reliability potential of concept. 
Detailed failure mode and effects analysis with added criticality and diagnostics 
estimates (FMEDA) made on component level address two areas of safety requirements. 
Dangerous failure rate requirements can be demonstrated. Secondly thorough criticality 
estimate addresses diagnostic coverage and safe failure fraction requirements. 
Distribution failure modes can be obtained from manufacturers and some failure rate 
sources provide it. Table 10 provides example of FMEDA calculation. 
 
Table 10 Example of failure mode analysis with criticality and diagnostics estimates 
Part Failure 
mode  
Effect Criticality Detectability Overall 
failure rate 
Distribution 
Res1 Short  
Zero 
value Dangerous Detectable 100 0,1 
 Open 
High 
value Safe Detectable  0,8 
 Drift 
Wrong 
value Dangerous Undetectable  0,1 
 
During concept phase analysis can be started on block level. After detailed design 
component level analysis work as design tool. They also provide evidence of safety 
integrity level for dangerous failures and safe failure fraction. Failure mode analysis 
should be used as living and evolving document during development project. [2]  
Failure rate estimates random hardware failures. Overall failure rate model is 
composed from random failures, early failures and wear out. Failure rate analysis 
quantifies sufficiently constant failures rates in mid life of product. The effect of early 
failures should be addressed with burn-in testing or extra precautions during 
commissioning. Product life cycle in safety critical applications shall be limited, since 
wear out failures should be prevented. [2] Early failure rate period can be also 
estimated. For example SN 29500 predicts following failure rates for integrated circuits 
in early failure period introduced in Table 11. [12] 
 
Table 11 Effect of early failures to overall failure rates 
Operating time in hours Increased failure rate factor  
0-100 2,9 
100-1000 2,2 
1000-3000 1,3 
3000- 1 
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From the Table 11 can be seen, that early failures have significant effect during first 
1000 hours of equipment usage. Wear out failure prediction should be made based on 
component data from suppliers. Component reliability data addresses constant failure 
rate region of bathtub curve. (Figure 19) In practice constant failure rate region is 
composed from all three failure types, but it is dominated by random failures. It is 
assumed that safety critical equipments are used during constant failure rate region. [2] 
Failure rate data is based on analysis from usage history of components. There 
are several sources for data and difference in rates between sources is significant. Most 
common source in the past has been MIL-HDBK-217F. It is released by US Department 
of Defense. Notice 2 has been released 1995 and especially integrated circuits have 
evolved much after its release. [2] Several other organizations have updated failure rate 
collections. In this study electronic component failure rates are referred to Siemens 
standard SN 29500. It is recommended by several organizations in Europe like TÜV 
Nord in Germany. General idea in both above mentioned failure rate sources is to 
provide basic failure rate for component type in question. Basic rate is provided in 
certain operating environment. Conversion to real operating environment is made with 
correlation factors.  
 
 
Figure 19 Failure rate bathtub curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
SN 29500 failure rate can be calculated with equation 8: 
 
TIUref pipipiλλ ***=     (8) 
Where: 
λ  is actual failure rate 
refλ  is failure rate basic level (reference) 
Upi  is voltage dependence factor 
Ipi  is current dependence factor 
Tpi  is temperature dependence factor 
 
 
Common cause failure rate analysis shall be taken into account in failure tolerant 
redundant systems. Modeling of common cause failure rate takes individual channel 
failure rates into account as redundant channels, but common cause failure rate is in 
series with combined failure rate of two redundant channels (Figure 20).  
 
 
 
Figure 20 Common cause failure rate model [2] 
 
Equation for combined redundant channels: 
 
21 * λλλ =RC      (9) 
 
Equation for common cause failure: 
 
)( 21 λλβλ +=CC     (10) 
Where:  
β  is common cause factor  
 
Equation for total failure rate: 
 
)(* 2121 λλβλλλ
λλλ
++=
→+=
tot
CCRCtot
   (11) 
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Failure rate model for redundant channels is calculated as AND-gate in fault tree model 
with equation 6. Failure rate model for combined common cause and individual failure 
is calculated as OR-gate in fault tree model with equation 7. Common cause failure rate 
is substituted with equation 10.  
β  varies typically between 0,1 to 0,005 depending from environment, system 
and application. Exact analyzing of common cause failures is not possible. Estimates 
can be obtained from statistical calculation software’s or IEC 61508 part6 Annex D 
calculation tables. In redundant systems common cause failure starts to dominate failure 
rate estimates like for example in symmetrical redundant two channel systems. [2]  
According to Smith after describing exact looking methods to model failure 
rates word of warning is needed: 
 
“Because failure rate is, probably, the least precise engineering parameter, it is 
important to bear in mind the limitations of reliability prediction.” [2] 
 
Equations and precise failure rate presented in failure rata data collections implies to 
precision, but in reality they only give guidance and comparison values for designs. 
 
6. MACHINERY CONTROL SYSTEM 
Analysis is made from vehicle graphical user interface and from typical automation 
sensor interfaces. Main focus on study is to develop concept for controlling safety 
critical features with graphical user interface. Detailed implementation and design of 
system is excluded from study to limit needed time and scope. Case study shall be used 
as a coaching and test case for development process and documentation. Notes and 
lessons learned shall be implemented to improve development cycle for the 
development of actual safety system.    
6.1. System requirements 
Graphical user interface is controlling safety critical vehicle functions trough 
communication to Electronic Control Units (ECU) actuating hydraulics or other types of 
actuators. ECU’s are designed to fulfill safety requirements and additional needed safety 
layers shall be achieved trough system concept. The terminal allows a user to safely 
make conscious commands. Rest of the system would perform the required function 
safely. However operator should in some case to able to override some safety limits. For 
example when using tractor as a wheel loader, operator must be able to lower bucket to 
ground. In some other situations it can be hazardous. To fulfill system level safety 
requirements user interface must be safe enough. 
System concept is constructed from at least two electronic units. One unit is 
acting as a human machine interface device (later referred as HMI device) and one or 
more units as a machinery electronics control units (later referred as ECU unit). System 
has two Controller Area Network (CAN) interfaces. One port is for non-safety critical 
communication and safety CAN is dedicated to safety critical communication. System 
side is simplified in picture. In reality CAN networks are distributed to more than one 
ECU. 
The system safety concept as illustrated in Figure 21 will be able to supervise 
safety critical functions as well as allow use of non-safety critical functions. HMI shall 
verify correctness of safety command. Correctness of safety command has two major 
requirements. Command was done consciously and particular command was intended to 
be executed. ECU shall verify that command is allowed under present conditions. For 
example implement detaching is never allowed when vehicle is moving. Conditions can 
wary over operational states. For example during road passage tractor front loader is 
inactive, but sometimes some functions are allowed under increased caution like using 
front loader in snow cleaning. In practical systems internal errors cause significant 
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source of failures. Internal monitoring shall be implemented in both HMI and ECU. 
Additional layer of safety can be achieved by crosschecking between HMI and ECU. 
Functional requirements are specified in Parker Vansco Display Platform Advanced 
(DPA) high level specification. [22] 
 
 
Figure 21 Machinery control system high level concept 
 
Control of safety critical functions 
“The operator will be able to enable or disable safety critical functions from the menu 
system. The user interface will be check-box type graphical object with one fixed color 
and font size. The location of checkbox graphical object in menu system will be fixed 
(safety critical graphical object cannot be located inside dynamic scrollable list)”.[22]  
 
Figure 22 is simplified state description of command and execute sequence. White 
states are start and idle stages. Blue states require input from operator and green states 
operator sees as the end result. Erroneous action by the operator leads to red stages. 
HMI error is caused by illogical command action and ECU error by violation system 
stage conditions. 
 For simplicity internal monitoring and error stages are ignored from system level 
concept. Sometimes also two way communication is needed to insure safety. For 
example activation of front loader in vehicle while moving should be verified from 
operator. ECU shall send request for exception of normal safety operation and HMI 
notifies operator. Operator input shall be verified and processed as in Figure 22.  
Difference between non-safety command and safety command is significant. 
Non-safety command can be implement with 9 stages and safety command needs 17 
stages. System implementation needs also additional stages for internal monitoring. 
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Safety requires increased complexity of design. Complexity of design increases 
possibilities for systematic and random failures.  
 
 
 
Figure 22 Concept for implementing safety critical operator command 
 
Control of safety critical parameters 
“The operator will be able to adjust safety critical parameters from menu system. The 
parameter adjustment will have limits (min, max) or group of values. The user interface 
will be an up/down editor graphical object with one fixed color and font size. The 
location of up/down editor graphical object in menu system will be fixed.” [22] 
 
Parameter management follows also Figure 22 procedure in high level, but execution of 
command does not lead directly to action in machinery. Only parameters in system are 
updated. Also realization of command verification shall be different, due to natural 
difference between adjustment and direct activation.  
 
Safety critical graphical information for operator 
“The operator will be able to view safety critical information graphically from the 
display. The warning indicator symbols will be predefined with fixed size and location 
in the menu system.” [22] 
 
In Figure 23 ECU act as initiator and request HMI to draw information message. HMI 
shall verify that operator will react to message. ECU shall initiate message request when 
any condition in system needs operator attendance. Typically this is used when 
condition does not lead to direct safety hazard, but risk is elevated for some reason. For 
example activation of front loader control while vehicle is moving leads to this kind of 
condition. Operator verifies that front loader operation is really intentional.  
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Figure 23 Concept for implementing safety critical information message 
 
Safety critical warnings for operator 
As a visual warning the operator will be able to view safety critical telltale LED’s 
above the LCD display. The graphics of the overlay and the color of the telltale LED 
are predefined. One telltale is dedicated for safety critical warnings. Safety critical 
sound warnings for the operator shall be implemented with warning tones from buzzer. 
Combined visual and sound warnings have build in redundancy. [22] 
 
Activation of operator warnings follows Figure 23 concept, but uses dedicated safety 
warning methods in combination to draw operator attention. It is used when system 
conditions lead to direct safety hazard. It could be for example internal error in safety 
related mechanical or electrical systems.  
 System level safety analyzing is done briefly and straight forward, since it is not 
the main focus in this study. It is intended to provide background information and 
starting point for low level analysis. System level analysis should be done or approved 
by OEM. First step was to figure out safety critical functions in equipment under 
control.  
 
Safety critical functions related to HMI: 
• View machine information graphically from the display 
• View machine information visually from telltales 
• Safely enable / disable machine functions 
• Play warning sounds 
 
In real application the amount of functions shall be higher and especially they should be 
described in more detail. Risk analysis was made to figure out failure modes and their 
severity, likelihood of exposure and possibilities to control damages. Results in Table 
12 were formed based on chapter 3.1. From Table 12 needed safety integrity levels were 
concluded with risk graph approach. Risk graph used was based on Figure 6.  
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All failures might lead to injury of bystander or operator, but quite rarely to death. 
Control errors are considered more likely than signaling errors, since signaling error 
does not lead necessarily to hazardous situation. Most of the failures as such are not 
controllable, but distorted or black display is considered to be more likely to be noticed.  
AgPL levels based on Table 13 are b and c. Levels b and c do not require any 
particularly strict safety features. They can be achieved with quite basic changes to 
present control systems. Category 2 was selected, because qualitative requirements for 
display software in self monitoring category 1 were considered to be unachievable.  
Display operating system was selected to be Linux based and safety assessment 
of open source software is in reality impossible. Use of open source code directly in 
safety critical system without individual monitoring requires full coverage testing and 
full coverage in testing is hard to achieve. However reliability as such is quite good in 
Linux based systems due to wide usage. Category 2 is illustrated in Figure 14. Table 14 
shows that required SIL is 2 at maximum. Qualitative requirements can be achieved 
with reasonable improvements to present development process. Main effort should be 
paid to structured specification and documentation of every step in process. SIL 2 levels 
are achievable with traditional tools and improved methods. Safety plans and some 
checklists are needed as additional features to process. Also design guides must be 
reviewed. High level changes are included to assessment checklist in Appendix A. 
 
Table 12 Risk analyzes for HMI related functions  
Function Failure Severity Exposure Controllability 
Safety critical vehicle 
function control  
Graphical display 
error S2 E3 C3 
 
Menu control 
error S2 E3 C3 
 
Parameter adjust 
error S2 E3 C3 
 
Communication 
timing error S2 E2 C3 
 
Communication 
content error S2 E2 C3 
Display warning symbols 
graphically 
Graphical display 
error S2 E3 C2 
Display signals with telltales No telltale S2 E2 C3 
 Wrong telltale S2 E2 C3 
Play warning sounds No sound S2 E2 C3 
 
Table 13 Safety integrity targets based on risk graph 
Function Failure Ag PL 
Safety critical vehicle function control  Graphical display error c 
 Menu control error c 
 Communication timing error b 
 Communication content error b 
Display warning symbols graphically Graphical display error b 
Display signals with telltales No telltale b 
 Wrong telltale b 
Play warning sounds No sound b 
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Table 14 Overall safety integrity levels for system based on category 
Function Failure Cat SRL (SIL) 
Safety critical vehicle function control  Graphical display error 2 1 
 Menu control error 1 1 
 Parameter adjust error 1 2 
 Communication timing error 2 2 
 Communication content error 2 B 
Display warning symbols graphically Graphical display error 2 B 
Display signals with telltales No telltale 1 1 
 Wrong telltale 1 1 
Play warning sounds No sound 1 1 
6.2. Human Machine Interface  
Graphical operator interfaces have become more attractive due to increased complexity 
in machinery controls. It is not very ergonomic to have tenths of buttons and levers for 
example in ships bridge or tractor cabin. In quite many cases required control tasks and 
series are complex. For example when turning tractor and implement around in the end 
of the field during cultivating, operator need handle implement functions, control 
hydraulics, change gears and turn the wheel. Also handling of ship based on real time 
positioning in oil field tasks is impossible when implemented with several independent 
levers. Automation of some tasks improves ergonomics greatly. Operator can for 
example make macro for handling implement and hydraulics and start macro when 
reaching the end of field. Automation of vehicle control systems leads to need of 
reliable and safe electrical system. It could be very dangerous to drop down the 
implement during road passage for example.  
HMI device layout in Figure 24 provides graphical user interface with 
information indication capabilities. Warning telltales with buzzer provide direct method 
to alarm operator in case of hazardous situation. Rotary encoder and four push buttons 
on bottom of unit allow efficient and easy menu navigation for operator. Side panel 
push buttons provide method to verify operator inputs with redundant device. This leads 
to a safe and user friendly HMI. Based on system requirements the operator needs to be 
able to perform Table 15 functions from the user interface. In the study focus is on 
analyzes of two safety functions, since they cover most of the interesting safety issues. 
Safely enable / disable machine functions and Hear warning tones are covered in 
following analyze.  
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Figure 24 Possible layout for safe machinery control system HMI device 
 
Table 15 HMI functional requirements 
Required function Criticality 
classification 
Adjust display brightness Safety related 
View and adjust the time of day from the display Non-safety 
View machine information graphically from the display Safety 
View machine information visually from telltales Safety 
Safely enable / disable machine functions Safety 
Manage user settings Safety related 
Manage diagnostic log (with timestamps) Non-safety 
Manage machine calibrations  Safety related 
Perform service functions (e.g. read service manual, data logging) Non-safety 
Hear warning tones  Safety 
Audio / video playback (e.g. mpeg, mp3) Non-safety 
 
Safely enable / disable machine functions 
Safe machine function control has two high level requirements. First is to verify 
operator intend. Second is to control internal errors. In the other words right function 
shall be commanded when intended. Operator intend is human error type failure and 
impossible to fully prohibit, but adequate measures shall be used to decrease likelihood. 
Internal errors shall be monitored with internal monitoring circuitry. Implementation 
uses secondary confirmation to address human errors. Operator shall be prompted to 
assure right intention. Internal monitoring scans menu actions made with main user 
interface. Display data shall be verified by internal monitoring. 
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Figure 25 Menu item selection 
 
Figure 25 shows typical menu control event. Rotary (A) encoder shall select function 
from list. Operator can activate highlighted selection with ACK (B) button. All safety 
functions shall have for example red text color and picture with red background. Menu 
selection user interface uses external keyboard device. Device is connected to main 
controller with serial interface. Also internal monitoring system shall have monitoring 
port for this serial interface. Monitoring checks correct menu position from main 
controller and makes display data check. 
 
 
Figure 26 Safety item confirmation 
 
Operator confirmation shall be verified with additional check after critical item 
selection. Operator must accept activation of functionality twice. Second accept shall be 
handled with different input device as in Figure 26. Function must be accepted within 
specified time window or it will be automatically cancelled. Secondary input device is 
connected to monitoring device and main controller has no control over it. Device is 
simple push button keypad. Timing of operator action is controlled with signal edges. 
Both signal transitions must fit to timing windows. Activation of signal should be inside 
specified timing window. Delay between activation and release must be adequate 
compared with typical human action.  
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Figure 27 Operator alarm display example 
Operator alarm 
Operator alarm can be triggered from systems via serial communication or HMI internal 
error could lead to alarm. Alarm should draw operator’s attention and needs to be 
confirmed with keypad activation as in Figure 27. During operator alarm stage warning 
symbol on display and stop telltale led flashes to draw operators attention. As an 
additional safety feature buzzer sound shall be used until alarm is acknowledged by 
operator. Using stop telltale and display symbol simultaneously with buzzer sound 
provides safety redundancy. 
6.3. Control ECU  
Typical ECU has sensor interfaces, actuator control outputs and communication ports. 
In machinery-control-systems sensors convert physical quantities to electronic signals. 
ECU converts electric signal back to physical quantity with signal conditioning and AD-
conversion. Units are connected to each other with CAN field bus. ECU actuator ports 
drive often solenoid type loads to control fluid flow or transform electric force to 
mechanical force. ECU designs are application specific and focus here is to provide 
only general ideas. Safety critical ECU system designs follow often architectural 
categories 2 or 3 presented in Figure 14. Control modules form a heart of safety systems 
and are responsible for safe operation of machinery.  
Reliable sensor interface requires diagnostics from whole circuitry. In most 
cases safe system design calls for redundant sensors. In some cases it is enough to 
diagnose failure in sensor and use safe default values to operate system. Attention 
should be paid to make sensors easily diagnosable. For example knock detection is very 
critical measurement in modern medium speed natural gas engine. Based on physics 
Otto cycle internal combustion engine fuel economy is best at knocking border. Active 
knock detection helps on approaching that border. Crossing that border causes risk of 
mechanical failure to engine and eventually a life threatening situation to people close 
to engine. Traditional knock detection method is very simple. Piezo-electric vibration 
sensor is used and AC-coupled signal is filtered and integrated to measure signal level 
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on certain frequency range. [17] In basic circuitry sensor is references to ground. DC-
level on signal lead is roughly same as ground. If sensor wire breaks, DC-level stay still 
on same level. Measurement result during wire break is same as internal noise on 
dedicated frequency range. This will be interpreted as no knock and wire break is not 
noticed. Control algorithm drives engine over the knock border, since knocking is not 
noticed. 
    
Figure 28 Patented improved knock detection sensor diagnostics [21] 
 
Diagnostics of piezo-electric signal can be quite easily improved with predetermined 
reference level on sensor reference lead as in Figure 28. Sensors have series resistance 
of around 1M. With additional pull down resistor signal lead DC-level can be set 
above ground level. DC-level does not need to be accurate. Wire is considered to be 
intact until DC-level is close to zero. Fault detection circuitry indicates failure to ECU 
CPU and operation with safe default values can be continued. This idea has been 
developed by design team including Parker Vansco and Wärtsilä engineers and patented 
by Wärtsilä. [21] Two redundant sensors can be used in systems were limiting of values 
like temperature is needed. If limit is reached by any of the sensors, system shall be 
forced to safe mode. If actual values are needed to operate system on any mode, sensor 
voting systems shall be used. In general highly dependable system should incorporate 
smart sensors and interfaces when possible. For example serial interface sensor with 
internal diagnostics would make system design easier. [18]  
Communication with field bus protocols is quite reliable. For example CAN bus 
specification include message CRC and reliability mechanisms like acknowledge from 
receiver to sender. Main concern is physical signal interruptions in bus lines. Redundant 
bus topologies allow communication rerouting in case of line failure. Also ring 
topologies could be used for reliable systems to recover from wire breaks.   
Actuator drives are most tricky to design to be fail safe. Outputs tend to be also 
most error prone, since drivers control often significant amounts of energy and there is 
also power losses related. Actuator drive requirements should be designed to safe OFF 
type. Otherwise system complexity increases dramatically. For example in battery 
powered systems dual power grid is needed.  
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Figure 29 Safety improvements for typical PWM type solenoid drive 
 
Typical solenoid drive needs mainly improvements to diagnostics. It is inherently quite 
safe due to dual side switches. Diagnostics are improved with dual side current 
measurement as in Figure 29. Comparison between current levels provides load 
circuitry integrity diagnostics. With these improvements drive circuitry itself is single 
fault tolerant. Additional power switch on driver can be used to shut off loads during 
major failure in unit. In most cases there is only one switch controlling all outputs in 
unit and it is controlled with independent monitoring circuitry. In category 2 (Figure 14) 
main control is handled with logic element, but safety monitoring is handled with 
independent monitoring logic. In most machinery controls category 2 have adequate 
safety level. Traditional control systems have high diagnostic coverage, because 
preventative maintenance and dependability is required anyway.  
 Additional safety measures are needed to reduce risk further. That requires 
specific monitoring circuitry and review of diagnostic features. Monitoring can be 
implemented for example with microcontroller. Monitoring must be able force system 
to safe state with independent ways. Additional power supply switch in Figure 29 
provides an independent channel to drive outputs to OFF and safe state. Most 
demanding challenge for safety system logic design is actually specification and 
implementation of software, since even in pretty simple control systems chains of 
events and cross references can became complex. Embedded system software design 
shall follow strict and appropriate process. In most cases company specific software 
design process with additional safety related measures works fine. For example Parker 
Vansco design process described by Salo can be used with some adjustments. [7] 
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6.4. HMI unit hardware requirements 
Display unit includes two types of interfaces. They are divided to human interfaces and 
system interfaces. Also some miscellaneous interfaces are needed to implement 
functional requirements. Most of the interfaces are considered as safety critical. 
Interfaces are illustrated in Figure 30 on black box level. Safety related interfaces to 
external system have red color. Only Vehicle CAN is considered non safety related. 
Also vehicle CAN is monitored by safety monitoring, but erroneous operation only on 
vehicle CAN cannot trigger safety hazard.  
Table 16 summarizes HMI unit external interfaces. 7” inches TFT widescreen 
color display was selected to concept, since market interest seams to move to that 
direction. Wide spectrum of operating conditions calls for active display. Passive 
displays have been earlier used in automotive industry, but for example temperature 
extremes cause more problems to them. Five buttons and telltales fit nicely to 
mechanical construction on the side of the display. Decision to connect main keyboard 
to serial interface was done, because quite often better ergonomics are achieved when 
keyboard is separated. For example in the tractor display could be mounted to 
dashboard close to window for easy readability while driving and keyboard to armrest 
where most control buttons and levers are located. Continuous power supply is needed 
for controlled shut down and key-lock shall wake up or power up the device. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30 HMI unit hardware requirements 
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Table 16 HMI unit interface summary 
Human interface  
Outputs: 7” WVGA TFT color display 
 
 5 Telltales 
 
 Buzzer 
Inputs: External keyboard with rotary encoder 
 5 buttons on display side 
System interface  
Communication: Vehicle CAN 
 Safety CAN 
Misc: Power supply 
 Keylock 
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Monitoring requirements are derived from risk analysis in Table 12 and introduced in 
Table 17. Monitoring of displayed data is done with calculation of CRC over screen 
area in question. CRC values are calculated during design of vehicle specific menu 
control structure and stored to monitoring equipment. All safety critical menu items 
have their own signature CRC. Also human interface devices are monitored and during 
system specific menu control design correct control commands are parameterized. 
Parameters are stored to monitoring system. Monitoring of telltale functions is 
implemented with current diagnostics from illuminated leds. Only those leds which are 
activated should consume power. Buzzer monitoring is done with buzzer current check. 
 
Table 17 Internal monitoring function examples 
Function Failure Diagnostics 
Safety critical vehicle 
function control  Graphical display error Graphic CRC 
 Menu control error 
Graphic CRC and menu 
control check 
 Parameter adjust error 
Graphic CRC and menu 
control check 
 Communication timing error Communication check 
 
Communication content 
error Communication check 
Display warning symbols 
graphically Graphical display error Graphic CRC 
Display signals with telltales No telltale Internal check with led currents 
 Wrong telltale Internal check with led currents 
Play warning sounds No sound 
Internal check with buzzer 
currents 
 
Structural specification calls for traceability on every level of specification. Starting 
point for specification is functional requirements. Table 18 shows few examples of 
traceability chains. Examples are selected to cover functionality to warn the operator. 
Chains form different kind of structures. Some chains might skip some levels forming 
shorter chain and in the other hand some requirements could be based on same level 
requirement. Unambiguousness and traceability combined requires short and clear 
requirement descriptions especially on lower levels. Requirement descriptions must be 
measurable to alloy easy testing.  
Functional requirement level (FRS) specifies what needs to be done and 
technical requirements level (TRS) tells how functions are fulfilled. FRS and TRS 
specifies unit on black box level and corresponding testing is done from external 
interfaces. Hardware architecture level (HWA) specifies hardware high level 
implementation and internal interfaces. Hardware module level (HW with module 
name) covers detailed module specification. 
Basic format used in study for requirement combines four attributes.  
Requirement is identified by unique name based on structural level and type combined 
with sequential coding in the end. For example FRS Operational C is highest level 
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(functional) requirement. It is classified as operational, because it is related to module 
operation with operator. C is unique sequence code for requirement. Requirement 
source is specified for lower level requirements. Test case provides information how 
requirement is verified or validated. Description is the actual specification for 
requirement. It should be simple and include tolerance. 
 
Table 18 Specification structure example 
Req. Source Test case Description 
FRS level       
FRS Operational C   Safety function 
validation 
Terminal need to 
be able to warn 
operator with 
warning tones / 
sounds and 
operator needs to 
them heavy noisy 
environment 
FRS HMI D   Safety function 
validation 
View machine 
information 
graphically from 
the display (e.g. 
Gauges, warning 
indicators) or from 
common telltales 
TRS level       
TRS Diagnostic 
LED C 
FRS HMI D Integration test Five telltale Leds 
for application 
purpose. 
TRS Diagnostic 
LED D 
FRS HMI D Functional 
validation 
Luminous 
intensity:  over 
5000 mcd 
TRS Diagnostic 
LED F 
FRS HMI D System Integration 
test 
As a safety feature 
fail leds shall have 
a feedback  
diagnostics 
TRS Buzzer A FRS Operational C Functional 
validation 
Sound pressure 
(1m): over 85 dB 
TRS Buzzer B FRS Operational C Functional 
validation 
Frequency range: 
200-1000 Hz 
±10Hz 
TRS Buzzer C FRS Operational C System Integration 
test 
As a safety feature 
buzzer shall have 
a feedback  
diagnostics 
HWA level       
HWA interface LED 
A 
TRS Diagnostic 
LED C 
HW integration 
test 
PWM control for 
led current 
HWA interface LED 
B 
HWA interface 
LED A 
HW integration 
test 
Led PWM 
resolution better 
than 1/100  
HWA interface LED 
C 
HWA interface 
LED A 
HW integration 
test 
Led PWM 
frequency higher 
than 500Hz  
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HWA interface LED 
D 
TRS Diagnostic 
LED F 
Safety function 
validation 
Analogue led 
current feedback 
to monitoring 
HWA interface LED 
E 
HWA interface 
LED D 
HW integration 
test 
Analogue led 
current feedback 
accuracy ±5% 
HWA interface 
Buzzer A 
TRS Buzzer A Safety function 
validation 
PWM control for 
buzzer current 
HWA interface 
Buzzer B 
HWA interface 
Buzzer A 
HW integration 
test 
Buzzer PWM 
resolution better 
than 1/1000  
HWA interface 
Buzzer C 
HWA interface 
Buzzer A 
HW integration 
test 
Buzzer PWM 
frequency higher 
than 10000Hz  
HWA interface 
Buzzer D 
TRS Buzzer A Safety function 
validation 
Analogue buzzer 
current feedback 
to monitoring 
HWA interface 
Buzzer E 
HWA interface 
Buzzer D 
HW integration 
test 
Analogue buzzer 
current feedback 
accuracy ±5% 
HW Module level       
LED A TRS Diagnostic 
LED C 
Simulation, 
prototyping or 
reused circuitry 
PWM control for 
led current 
LED B TRS Diagnostic 
LED F 
Simulation, 
prototyping or 
reused circuitry 
Current to voltage 
converter: 0-50mA 
IN / 0-5V OUT 
LED C TRS Diagnostic 
LED F 
Simulation, 
prototyping or 
reused circuitry 
Current to voltage 
converter 
accuracy ±3% 
BUZZER A TRS Buzzer A Simulation, 
prototyping or 
reused circuitry 
PWM control for 
buzzer current 
BUZZER B TRS Buzzer C Simulation, 
prototyping or 
reused circuitry 
Current to voltage 
converter: 0-
200mA IN / 0-5V 
OUT 
BUZZER C TRS Buzzer C Simulation, 
prototyping or 
reused circuitry 
Current to voltage 
converter 
accuracy ±3% 
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Table form of requirements alloys easy traceability with verification matrix formed 
from requirement tables. Verification matrix can be used in spreadsheet form to filter 
and follow requirement changes during specification reviewing and changes. Table 18 
shows only strict requirement part of specification document. Natural language 
representation gives designer a better view of requirement and semi formal modeling 
illustrations as pictures are beneficial. For example Universal Modeling Language 
(UML) type descriptions are strongly recommended. [14] 
 
 
Figure 31 System operational modes 
 
For example operational modes specification in Figure 31 is very illustrative compared 
to natural language description. It would be really hard to describe unambiguously 
relations between stages exactly. It is easy to say that system should be ready to run 
when operator comes to cabin and it should be running when ignition engaged. Sentence 
above is basic specification, but also returns back from different states need to be 
specified. Also unexpected situations like operator just visiting cabin and going away 
has to be considered. Power of modeling languages is in making complex systems more 
intuitive. 
6.5. Implementation concept 
Category 2 type implementation uses individual safety monitoring logic as in Figure 32. 
Test logic can force system to safe state and prevent false triggering of safety critical 
machine functions. In the other hand operator warnings have redundancy, since 
warnings can be triggered by main logic or test logic. Communication correctness shall 
be verified with dual messaging. Messages with safety critical activation commands 
must be accepted by both logics. Main logic shall use vehicle CAN to transfer messages 
and test logic must confirm message with safety CAN.  
Human interface devices are divided to two blocks. External pointing device and 
keypad shall be read with main logic and the test logic verifies correctness of main logic 
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menu functions with menu skeleton and pointing device monitoring. Secondary operator 
confirmations are handled trough side button panel and it is handled trough test logic. 
Side button actions are communicated to main logic trough test logic. 
 Visual information to operator shall be handled with dual channels. Main logic 
controls TFT display and display data is verified by test logic. Display control on main 
logic side provides CRC from display data blocks when requested and test logic 
compares values to predetermined values from design tool chain. Telltales can be used 
as a back up for visual warning to operator. Buzzer provides redundancy for visual 
warnings and human error.  
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Figure 32 HMI unit hardware concept 
 
Main logic and test logic requires individual power supplies and careful interface design 
to prevent common cause failures based on common circuitry. All common parts and 
interfaces shall be well diagnosed to maintain safe state during random failures. Special 
attention should be paid on power up and down sequences and overall diagnostics of 
internal functions.  
6.6. Failure rate estimates 
As described in chapter 4.2 random failures shall be analyzed on circuitry level to get 
failure rate estimate for single blocks. Then blocks must be combined and total values 
for channels calculated. Channel estimates shall consider also common cause failures. 
Random failures for circuitry blocks are calculated with FMEDA method and channel 
values are based on blocks and estimates of common cause failure risk. Channel values 
are calculated with fault tree method described in chapter 5. 
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Estimates were calculated in Table 10 format. Full calculation is in Appendix B. 
Calculation is example from safety ECU solenoid driver circuitry. Table 19 presents 
total values for different failure types described in Figure 11. Safe failure fraction for 
solenoid drive circuitry is 96% based on equation 5. It is reasonably high and adequate 
for SIL2 design with 0 hardware fault tolerance according to Table 8.  
 
Table 19 FMEDA results 
TOTALS FIT SD FIT SU FIT DD FIT DU 
     
 3200 3170 690 270 
 
Failure rates for individual blocks are not interesting. They must be combined to form 
whole functional safety channels and common cause failures rate should be estimated. 
Common cause failure rate estimate is based on Table 9. Table score was calculated to 
be 75%. Reasoning for score can be read from Table 20. Common cause failure factor  
was estimated to be reasonably low, since 75% was quite good result. 0,01 was used for 
 value in common cause failure rate calculations.  
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Figure 33 Safety ECU simple control channel failure rate based on fault tree 
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Figure 33 illustrates combined failure rate for simple control channel example. System 
controls proportional solenoid valve based on analogue information from two redundant 
sensors. Sensors use different method to convert physical signal to voltage. System safe 
state can be achieved with solenoid valve shut off. Due to that single solenoid drive can 
be used with additional shut down described in chapter 6.3. Failure rates for elements 
are based on calculation in Appendix B and estimates from SN29500 [12]. From sensor 
interface example can be seen that common cause dominates redundant channel design 
failure rate estimates. Control logic causes most of dangerous failures, since it is most 
complex block in the system. Total failure rate in Figure 33 is 2815 FIT’s. For SIL2 
level applications FIT under 1000 is required.  
 
Table 20 Common cause estimate for safety ECU 
No. Measure against CCF Reasoning Score % (YES 
full score, NO 0)
1 Separation / segmentation
Physical separation between signal and 
power paths?
Same connector for signal and 
power
0
2 Diversity
Different technologies/design or 
physical principles applied? 
Different sensor types used in 
sensor redundancy
20
3 Design / application / experience
3.1 Protection against over-voltage, over-
pressure, over-current
Industrial and automotive 
requirements fulfilled 
15
3.2 Selected components are successful 
proven for several years
under consideration of environmental 
conditions?
New combonets partly used 0
4 Assessment / analysis
Are the results of a failure mode and 
effect analysis (FMEA) taken
into account to avoid common cause 
failures in design?
YES 5
5 Competence / training
Are designers/ technicians trained to 
understand the causes and
consequences of common cause 
failures?
NO (First safety project) 0
6 Environmental
6.1 EMC
Has the system been checked for EMC-
aspects (e.g. as specified
in relevant product standards)?
Industrial and automotive 
requirements fulfilled 
25
6.2 Other influences
Are the requirements for immunity to all 
relevant environmental
influences like, temperature, shock, 
vibration, humidity (e.g. as
specified in relevant standards e.g. ISO 
15003) considered?
Industrial and automotive 
requirements fulfilled 
10
Total 75
  
 54 
6.7. Safety assessment 
Safety assessment contains review of project deliverables and proposed actions based 
on reviews. Checklists are powerful tools for assessment work, but main requirement is 
proper assessor competency. Assessment shall be done by someone who has adequate 
independence from project organization. Checklist in Appendix A can be used as 
starting point for company producing machinery-control products. Checklist is adapted 
from example by Smith. [1]  
 Checklist describes minimum requirements for SIL2 level systems. Main focus 
in assessment shall be in qualitative requirements, since level of rigor is not as obvious 
as with quantitative requirements. Checklist should be used alongside with evidence of 
fulfilled requirements. In the other words OK can be checked only with proper 
evidence. In some projects some requirements might be not applicable, but in that case 
NA should be used. NA needs always explanation for the exception. 
 Safety assessment cannot be passed in this stage since project is in concept 
phase. Assessment checklist helps in steering the project to right direction and most 
tools are used on concept phase to evaluate different approaches. Checklist can be used 
also as gap analyze for company design process. For example testing is often done, but 
evidence of testing is not recorded according to safety standard requirements.  
 In Parker Vansco case structuring of design and documentation is big challenge. 
Also some design guides should be revised to fulfill all requirements. Validation 
planning needs attention, since it is often co-operation with customers and 
responsibilities should be clear. Most requirements are at least partly covered, since 
Parker Vansco have a company level ISO9001 certificate for operations. 
7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Dependability can be seen as result from availability, reliability and safety as indicated 
earlier, but sometimes all three do not walk hand in hand. Analysis techniques address 
all aspect in general, but required actions after analysis need to have focus to wanted 
direction. In most cases increased reliability offers also higher availability. Safety 
requirements sometimes counteract against availability, since in fault conditions 
availability is reduced because of safety hazards. Safety and reliability requirements 
easily lead to more complex systems and it might lead to higher need of service. Service 
time means lowered availability in most cases. 
It is important to consider this during concept phase. Safety level targeting needs 
to be adequate, but not over engineered. Reliability considerations should be made on 
overall level and without unnecessary complexity. Safety is also application and 
situation specific issue. It could be hard for design engineer to foresee all possible cross 
references between different operational situations. For example running ship engine 
without oil pressure is hazardous situation and might lead to high costs and possible 
injuries to operator. When ship is sailing on hazardous waters near land, most captains 
are willing to accept risking engine instead of whole ship anyway.  System analyzes 
should be made with cross functional teams and contracting of design work must made 
with special care.  
Figure 34 illustrates that during concept phase decision of focus point should be 
set between three attributes of dependability. Safety level is often set by external 
authorities and customer focus is somewhere between availability and reliability. In 
reality costs often drive design heavily and especially in sub contracting they are 
decisive factor. Instead of hardware cost and direct development cost attention should 
be paid to total costs including whole product life cycle. Most of methods are very 
efficient also in non-safe projects, since they insure higher quality of product. 
 
Figure 34 Focus of dependability 
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System complexity 
Low cost demand and usability leads to integration of functional and safety systems. 
Increased complexity needs more controlled way of working and higher robustness of 
hardware. Especially specification becomes hard to handle with traditional tools. 
System design plays major role in reducing unnecessary complexity. Traditional sub-
contracting should be replaced with partnership to enable efficient cross functional 
design teams. Setting up boundaries between design teams and relying solely to 
specifications tends to lead partial optimization. Separation of safety functions and other 
functions should be considered where possible without major decrease of usability.  
For example basically all safety functions requiring other safe state than power 
OFF are really hard to design for vehicle environments, since there is normally only one 
battery system. Lead acid battery has failure rate of 30 / million miles according to 
Smith [1]. Say we assume that vehicle is operated 10 miles / hour speed, which is most 
probably too optimistic assumption. This leads to failure rate of 300 / million hour 
which is in the other words 3 * 10-4 / hours. When comparing to Table 1 one can figure 
out that rate is outside any safety integrity requirement. In most cases as simple as 
possible is best alternative!  
Design work 
Design process can be fine tuned endlessly, but there is no substitute for right 
engineering attitude. Design team must be motivated to work together to achieve true 
dependability in product. Sometimes biggest challenge in organization might be to 
maintain right safety attitude and being open towards new tools, since especially in the 
beginning they tend to take more time to use. Motivation should be done by showing 
the benefits from new work methods. After bad first impression most engineers tend to 
admit benefits from new tools and methods.  
During concept design engineers are easily miss leaded to think only 
functionality. Special care should be paid on common parts in system which are not 
directly related to functions like power supplies. During the system design weakest links 
should be identified. It does not make sense to make chain stronger than weakest link, 
since in most cause it is costly. For example engineers tend to forget biggest failure 
cause, which is wiring and connectors in most systems. 
Design work assessment should be more like coaching instead of audit in the 
end, because late changes due to assessment tend to be costly and complex. (Figure 35) 
Attention should be paid to on requirements management and specification phase. After 
concept phase assessor should be consulted to get first indications of success. After all 
true safety is built on right attitude from beginning of the project. Any audit process is 
not capable to supersede open minded and through engineering work.  
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Figure 35 Failures created vs. rework costs [23] 
Specification 
Traceability seems to be most demanding challenge, when structural way of working is 
compared with traditional ways to make specifications. Specifications tools would help 
in process, but they do not make the work itself. They mainly help in traceability issues. 
Structured specification should be seen as an advantage. Well structured specification 
allows module level reuse of design. Good interface specifications makes concurrent 
engineering work easier and causes less rework.  
Machinery control system 
Appendix A checklist shows that project documentation is not finished and especially 
safe plan needs improvements. There is still lot of work to do on qualitative 
requirements before project can be accepted to safety usage. Table 21 summarizes 
quantitative requirements for machinery-control-system. Diagnostics and common 
cause points are under control, but overall failure rate needs small improvement.2815 
FIT is in range compared to 1000 FIT and concept is anyway going to right direction. 
Figure 33 indicates that logic control part of the units should be improved, since it is a 
bottleneck in the design. Improved diagnostics could change dangerous undetected 
failures to detected failures or changes in circuitry could change failure modes to safe 
ones. For example using pull down instead of pull up or vice versa could lead to safe 
failure. In most cases simple changes in circuitry to change failure effect are more 
efficient than complex diagnostics. Quite often circuitry related directly to logic is 
dominated by microcontroller and they are inherently safe. Attention should be paid to 
glue logic and miscellaneous circuitry not related directly to functionality. For example 
intelligent power supply monitoring and sequencing could lower dangerous failures 
significantly. 
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Table 21Summary of machinery control system quantitative analysis  
Discipline Machinery concept 
result 
SIL 2 level requirement 
SFF consideration 96% (ECU) >90% 
Dangerous failure rate 2815 FIT <1000 FIT 
CCF consideration 75% >65% 
Future considerations 
During this study work some notes were made what points could be improved in design 
flow. Work flow should follow more closely V-model. Present work flow is more water 
fall than V-model. Documentation model based on UML should be developed and 
structure of documentation reviewed even more deeply. Especially document change 
management needs attention. Work flow guidelines and recording of tasks should be 
more detailed. For example testing is often done, but evidence from the work is vague 
or not existing. Fault insertion testing is lacking from present work flow and strategy for 
it should be created. 
From the technical point of view wireless communication will be very 
interesting in future, since absence of wiring have several benefits. Using wireless 
communication in critical systems has still many challenges to overcome. Many critical 
systems have electrically noisy environment and wireless security is far from wired 
system security.  
Hints for efficient safety system design: 
 
• Total cost instead of unit cost 
• Concept phase work important 
• Emphasize to start of project 
• Requirements management 
• Tracing between requirements and testing 
• Weak links identified in system design 
• Wiring and connectors 
• Different technologies for redundancy 
• Can system be designed to be inherently safe? 
• Isolation of safety and non-safety 
• Smart sensor interfacing 
• Change management 
• Burn in testing needed? 
• Wear out limits for electronic units? 
• Hardware category targeting could ease qualitative requirements 
• All work should be documented carefully 
• Keep it simple and motivate design team! 
8. CONCLUSION 
Need for highly dependable programmable machinery control system have become 
obvious during the last the decade. Traditionally machinery control systems have 
mechanical back up on control for critical functions, but modern systems rely solely to 
PE-systems also in critical functions. Recent development has been noticed by legal 
authorities and legislative requirements are effective soon for new products entering to 
market. Main focus in the study was to interpret standard requirements to process 
changes and to understand basic philosophy for reliable programmable system 
hardware. Usage of tools and methods were tested and demonstrated with machinery 
control system concept development. 
 Dependability should be seen as a product life cycle challenge. All steps of 
product life cycle from system analysis to decommissioning shall be planned and 
documented. Dependable control system provides continuously correct service for 
customer without hazardous consequences to people or public. System should be also 
maintained and modified in controlled manor. High dependability can be achieved 
trough careful and planned work during design, manufacturing and operation. Basic 
idea is avoidance of failures when possible, but all failures cannot be evaded. In case of 
failure system should react in controlled manner.  
 System analysis is focused to find links and chains between causes, failures and 
consequences. Discovered risks shall be quantified on their potentiality to harm people 
or environment. There is always a probability of catastrophic consequences, but 
likelihood should be on tolerable region compared to every day risks. OEM’s set up 
goal for risk level reduction in final product and is responsible for risk analysis and 
validation of end product. Often contractors are responsible for realization phase of 
control system units. They should focus on fulfilling goal set by OEM. Good usage of 
proper tools provides evidence of work. Tools also guide work effort to right direction. 
FMEA analysis with fault tree diagrams provide good starting point for system and 
architecture level analysis. FMEDA provides evidence for final design integrity 
requirements. 
 Failures can be qualified to two groups. Firstly there are failures which occur 
randomly and consequences of those failures should be controlled and effects 
minimized. Quantitative requirements set a goal for random failure avoidance. Second 
failure category is systematic failures arising from wide range of causes. Quite often 
misunderstandings or lack of knowledge lead to specification mistakes. Mistakes during 
development are other primary cause for systematic failures. Qualitative requirements 
address systematic failures. In general avoidance of failures can be divided to four basic 
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categories. Random failures should be controlled in proper manner. System should fail 
predictably and as planned. Hardware architecture selection should address single point 
failures and bottlenecks in system. Systematic error shall be avoided with proper work 
flow. 
 Random failures shall be addressed with adequate diagnostic coverage and fault 
tolerant circuit design. Component selection should emphasize reliability. Reliability 
oriented development process and proper work flow in every step of product lifecycle 
will lead to reduced number of systematic failures. V-model based development process 
is highly recommended to provide feedback between requirements and testing evidence. 
Structured work methods and specifications provide good traceability between 
requirements and testing. Misunderstandings can be minimized with unambiguous 
documents and work guidelines. Lot of effort should be paid to creation and verification 
of proper specification, since it reduces systematic errors and costs. Evidence of design 
correspondence to requirements should be demonstrated with testing on adequate level. 
Evidence of qualitative requirements is based on audits and documentations. 
 Typical system concept for machinery control is distributed system. Human 
interface device is located near operator and control unit is connected trough serial 
interface with it. CAN bus is widely used in automotive and industrial applications for 
communication between devices. Communication redundancy is needed and two 
separate CAN lines provide needed protection against wire breaks and communication 
errors. Communication is divided to two categories. Non-critical messaging uses only 
one dedicated CAN bus for system communication. Critical messages shall be 
transmitted in both CAN busses to achieve desired integrity level. Human interface 
device verifies that correct command is transmitted to system. Also intention of 
command is verified. ECU shall monitor system stage and operational conditions and 
makes decision to implement command only when it is safe. 
 Developed concept was analyzed starting from system level. Qualitative 
integrity level 2 was targeted. Analysis indicated that highest integrity requirement is 
Ag PL c. Level c can be implemented with several ways, but hardware category 2 was 
selected. Category 2 implementation can be used with integrity level 2 on AgPL c level 
design. Structured specification template was developed for use in Parker Vansco. 
Structure was needed to be able to fulfill tracking requirements. Fault tree method was 
introduced for block diagram level analysis. FMEDA design template was developed 
and failure rate data sources investigated. Siemens standard SN29500 was selected as a 
baseline failure rate data. Results from Fault tree and FMEDA analysis indicated that 
concept fulfills requirements quite well, but on detail level diagnostics should be 
improved especially on common parts.  
 Safety assessment analysis was implemented as much as possible on concept 
level to minimize large scale changes in the back end of the project. Safety assessment 
checklist was created for use in Parker Vansco. Lot of the safety related documentation 
must be created compared to projects with non-safe systems. Other general remark was 
that most of engineering tasks related to safety are done, but not documented 
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thoroughly. Attention should be paid on creation of evidence from completed tasks. 
Electronic designs as such are already quite close to required level, because applications 
anyway call for high diagnostic coverage and reliability. Circuitry should be only fine 
tuned to achieve required integrity level.  
 Focus of dependability should be considered in the beginning of each project, 
since there is some trade offs between different dependability attributes. Focus can be 
either on absolute safety or in availability. Decisions should be based on legislative 
aspects and customer requirements. In general development of highly dependable 
systems is big challenge for organization from attitude point of view. There is no 
substitute for right attitude among engineers. From the technical point of view best 
alternatives are often the simplest ones! 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 Safety assessment checklist for machinery control concept project at present status 
Requirement Evidence  OK 
General     
Quality plan  
Vansco 
Electronics QS   OK 
Safety plan     
Documentation plan     
Project management (According to company QS) 
 Vansco 
Electronics QS   OK 
      
Life cycle     
Product life cycle plan (According to company QS 
including modifications and failure logging) 
 Vansco 
Electronics QS   OK 
Product life cycle audit     
      
Specification     
Unambiguous  Review minutes OK 
Structured  Review minutes OK 
Safety function description with Integrity requirement  Review minutes OK 
Operational modes  Review minutes OK 
Safety / non-safety isolation  Review minutes OK 
Specification inspection  Review minutes OK 
      
Design and development     
Design guides 
 Vansco 
Electronics QS   OK 
Design standards 
 Vansco 
Electronics QS   OK 
Design documentation 
 Vansco 
Electronics QS   OK?? 
Structured design     
Use of proven designs     
Modular design     
Reliability margining      
Safe failure modes     
Failure detection methods     
Communication errors     
Change of safety related HW and SW prohibited 
from user     
User interface design      
Fault tolerance techniques     
Environmental stress screening     
Failure mode testing     
      
Quantitative requirements     
Safe failure fraction demonstration (FMEDA)     
Random failure demonstration (FMEDA)     
Common cause estimates     
Testing and integration     
Test plan (acceptance criteria, tools and set up)     
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Functional testing (cross referencing and out 
boundaries testing)     
Component environmental tests     
Component interference tests     
Component fault insertion testing     
Test log audit   
     
Operations and maintenance     
Preventive maintenance     
Proof testing schedule     
Pilot installation audit     
Failure logging     
Operator friendliness     
Restricted operator access     
Operator training      
      
Purchasing     
Supplier audits 
  Vansco 
Electronics QS  
 OK 
      
Validation     
Validation plan     
System functional tests     
System environmental tests     
System interference tests     
System fault insertion testing     
Safety functionality during faulty operating conditions     
Validation log audit     
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APPENDIX B 
 
FMEDA calculation sheet for solenoid driver block 
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